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ABORTION LEGISLATION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE*
Prefatory Statement
The subscribers to this brief* are concerned about two issues
raised in briefs filed in support of appellant: First, the contention
that anti-abortion legislation offends the Establishment Clause and
Freedom- of Religion Clause of the Constitution; and, second, the
contention that society is powerless under the Constitution to legislate
any controls over abortion.
The implications inherent in those two contentions are most
serious. If a criminal law designed to protect existing but unborn
life is invalid because there are concurrent thoughts on the subject
in the field of religion and morals, the way will be cleared for similar
attacks on a variety of legal restraints on human conduct. And if
the law is powerless to protect the life of the existing but unborn
child, and the life of this most helpless of all beings is thereby left
to the will or whim of others, the lives of countless numbers of such
children will be in jeopardy.
It is strange that during a period in our nation's development
when there is serious re-examination of such problems as capital
punishment, on the basis that human lives are sacred, there should
arise a movement to disregard entirely the existing lives of the
unborn. There is a perplexing inconsistency in this situation.
Similarly, in a period when the law has developed controls to
protect the rights of the weak and the helpless, it is strange that
some would withdraw from the law the right to protect the most
weak and helpless of all, the conceived but unborn.
Of course, this brief is addressed to substantial issues of broad
implication, and is not concerned with the specific guilt or innocence
of the appellant as an individual.
* For the facts and statute ftwolved in this brief refer to -the Introductory
Comment-Abortion Litigation-published in this issue at pp. 106-07.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Right and Duty of the State to Protect Fetal Life Exists
Without Violating the Establishment or Freedom of Re-
ligion Clauses of the Constitution.
A. Overlapping of Criminal Law and Morality.
Two of the amici curiae briefs supporting appellant contend
that anti-abortion laws (actually any legal restraints on abortion)
violate the constiutional prohibition against the establishment of
religion or the free exercise thereof.' (A.C.L.U. Br. pp. 34-40;
Armstrong Br. pp. 20-22.)
This contention is structured on the premise that "certain religious
groups" '2 believe abortion destroys a human life. Consequently,
it is argued, abortion laws constitute a perpetuation of a religious
dogma.
What this argument overlooks is the inherent inevitability of
concurrence of criminal law, on the one hand, with ethical, moral
and religious principles on the other, for the reason that they
are all concerned with human conduct. The state's prohibitions
of murder and theft, for example, are not rendered invalid because
they are coincidentally forbidden by the Ten Commandments.
Despite the impossibility of eliminating moral considerations
from the laws of society, ' criminal law approaches the regulation of
human conduct from a direction and for a purpose essentially different
from that of religion or any system of ethics or morality.4 The
1 U.S. Const. Amend. 1; applicable to states by Amend. XIV.
2While the expression "certain religious groups" when read in context
seems to be a euphemism for "Catholic", there is substantial non-Catholic
theological opinion against abortions. For example, Deitrich Bonhoeffer,
Karl Barth and Paul Ramsey, all eminent Protestant theologians, have written
strongly against abortions and in favor of the unborn child's right to life
(Quoted at length in McLaughlin, Abortion, Catholic Mind, Jan., 1969, pp.
26, 27).
3 Discussed in Harding, Law Without Morality? RELIGION, MORALITY
AND LAW, (Southern Methodist University Press, 1956).
4Professor Paul Ramsey, Harrington Spear Professor of Religion at
Princeton University, stated in his paper to the International Conference on
Abortion, sponsored by Harvard Divinity School and Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.
Foundation, 1967:
"My first point is a plea for greater sanity in the debate about abor-
tion law reform. This plea is against the credence that is currently
given to the contention that anyone who opposes some, any, or all of
the proposed legal reforms must illicitly be seeking to impose his re-
ligious opinions or those of one religion in our society upon the rest
of us."
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validity of criminal laws can be judged from the viewpoint solely
of whether they are proper for the state, without regard to some
concurrent debate which might occur, especially in a pluralistic
society, among those professing various approaches to theology or
morality.
It is not the function of the courts to resolve disputes concerning
theology or dogma, as the United States Supreme Court recently
reiterated in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull,
U.S. Sup. Ct. Bulletin, p. B577. But this will not relieve the
courts of the necessity of rendering decisions as to the proper role
of the state in a field which overlaps into the area of morality or
moral theology.
The problem of obscenity, for example, has generated debate
among writers of differing schools and opinions in the field of
morals.5 But the existence of this debate has not hampered the
courts from deciding, in case after case, problems of obscenity, not
from the viewpoint of religion or of morality per se, but from the
viewpoint of the proper role of the state.
Similarly, there are recognized writers, such as Glanville Williams,6
and clergymen, such as Joseph Fletcher,7 who advocate not only
abortion, but euthanasia. But no court has held that a possible or
existing moral and religious difference of opinion over the ultimate
implications of the sanctity of life precludes the state from prohibiting
these killings or the courts from determining any issues arising
therefrom.
In the present case, the court is confronted with the necessity of
determining whether the state has any right to restrict abortions.
This requires a consideration of the proper role of the civil authorities;
which issue can be, and should be, met without becoming in-
volved in the dogma or tenets or beliefs of religion or any religious
group. The fundamental question is whether or not the state has
a legitimate interest or duty in prohibiting or regulating attacks
A quotation in the A.C.L.U. Brief, (page 36) strongly suggests the view
that all obscenity and what were termed "morality" laws are unconstitutional
as not consistent with the separation of Church and State. This points to the
doors which would be opened if the A.C.L.U. succeeded in its contention
here. It would be interesting to know if the writer of the brief would apply
the same reasoning to euthanasia.
6 Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, Ch.
VIII, Alfred V. Knopf, 1957.
I Fletcher, Moral Responsibility, The Westminster Press, Ch. IX (paper-
back ed.).
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on fetal life, and the fact that certain religious groups attach to
such life a dignity and sanctity which is apparently denied by those
who believe this is not a matter for state interference at all, is
irrelevant to the issue.8
The nature of the problems arising if the religious issue is raised
is demonstrated by the very argument advanced by the A.C.L.U.
For example, the argument is replete with references to a "current
religious position of particular church groups" that the life of the
fetus arises at the moment of conception, which position, it is
argued, "is not generally accepted by the public." To suggest that
the court should determine the precise character or the efficacy or
the popularity of a proposition of moral theology, as such, is to
impose on the court a function, the very exercise of which would
raise serious questions, not only of propriety, but of constitutionality
under the holding of Presbyterian Church v. Hull, supra.
Of course, in determining the issue of the validity of abortion
restraints, the court cannot withdraw from the necessity to make
a serious appraisal of the nature of the life which is taken in an
abortion, in order to distinguish the implications of an abortion
from those involved in surgery such as an appendectomy. If it
were certain that a fetus were nothing more than an appendage
of its mother, with no vestigae of individuality or potentiality of its
own, abortion laws could be approached with some justifiable reserve.
But these considerations must be confined to the secular and natural
8 Representatives of the fields of ethics, law, medicine and social sciences
met in September, 1967 at Washington, D.C. at an International Conference
on Abortion sponsored by the Harvard Divinity School and Joseph P. Ken-
nedy Foundation. The Panel of ethicians, representing a spectrum of moral
opinions, did agree on the following:
"From the present available data, we can only conclude that human
life begins at conception, or no later than "blastocyst" (about 8 days
after fertilization). The fetus, therefore, at least from blastocyst,
deserves respect as human fetal life." (Summary Reports of Working
Groups, International Conference on Abortion).
The concurrence of opinion among ethicians that human fetal life deserves
respect should be viewed with the undoubted concurrence of all men of good-
will with the admonition "thou shall not kill."
It has been stated:
"Even though this commandment in a part of religious belief, it is
also inherent in human nature, ratified by the unfailing experience of
time itself and in all diversities of peoples and in all areas. It there-
fore needs no reference to chapter and verse." (James Frances Car-
dinal McIntyre, unpublished paper, 1969).
The power of the legislature to protect fetal life should be considered in
the light of the concurrence described above.
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order, within the competence and authority of the court, and
without the necessity of choosing one theological position over
another.
For example, there are substantial physiological indicia that the
embryo or fetus is in essence vitally different from mere living tissue.
From the moment of conception, its sex and the color of its eyes
and hair are fixed by the genes and, before most abortions are
performed, actions of the heart is actually incipient. Nothing need
be added except nourishment for it to develop, grow and mature.
These considerations are not dogmatic or theological, so as to be
separated from the role of the court, but are physiological and
secular.'
Also, the recognition which the law has historically and increasingly
furnished to the "humanity" and "personality" of conceived but un-
born children (as elaborated upon elsewhere in this brief) is not
religious or sectarian, but is especially suitable for the consideration
of the court.
On the other hand, such problems as when an unborn child
is animated by a human soul is strictly theological and outside the
area in which the courts should function. Because of this, the
gratuitous and not wholly accurate descriptions of the theology of
those religions which oppose abortion, as contained in the A.C.L.U.
brief, should not be given weight.
B. Nature and Protectibility of Fetal Life Cannot
Be Determined by Public Opinion Polls.
Nor should the basic issue whether an existing but unborn child
is of such nature or potentiality that the law can constitutionally
protect it be determined by speculations as to public opinion (A.C.
L.U. Br. p. 38) even if those speculations were supported and
fully accurate, for if the existing but unborn life is indeed de-
serving of the law's protection, it is just such a life, weak and
helpless (as well as innocent), that the law should protect above
all as a matter of fundamental justice or natural law, regardless
of fluctuations of public opinion on matters which are not
particularly susceptible to determination by polls and tabulations.
9 It would be most difficult for anyone to view the photographs of human
fetal development made by Lennart Nilsson without recognizing the physical
humanity of fetal life. These photographs appear after page 46 of "The
Terrible Choice", a report of the International Conference on Abortion re-
ferred to above. (Bantam Book, 1968.)
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As the United States Supreme Court has stated in the famous
Scottsboro case concerning the helpless:
"Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner charged
with a capital offense, who is deaf and dumb, illiterate
and feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, with the
whole power of the State arrayed against him, prosecuted
by counsel for the State without assignment of counsel
for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death.
Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be
little short of judicial murder, it cannot be doubted would
be a gross violation of the guarantee of due process of
law; and we venture to think that no appellate court,
State or Federal, would hesitate so to decide . .
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45.
The necessity of isolating from the vagaries of public opinion
the basic protections guaranteed persons by the natural law
and the Constitution is illustrated in the field of civil rights and
civil liberties, where the object of the law's protection is often
alone and helpless in a hostile society. But who can be more
helpless and alone than a child conceived but not yet born, whose
mother wants to take its life? If the law is zealous to protect
minorities, and even to protect confessed criminals, from the
arbitrary actions of others (even if those others constitute a major-
ity), how can this zeal be denied the existing but unborn child on
the basis of some public opinion poll?
C. The Law Cannot Leave Issue of Nature of Fetal
Life to Individual Decision.
It is the proper, and indeed essential, obligation of the law
to protect the weak and the helpless, especially if they be in the
minority. Therefore, it is not sufficient to say that there is a dif-
ference of opinion among good and well-meaning people about
the obligation to surround the existing but unborn with pro-
tection. This cannot be left, as has been advocated, to the
subjective determinations of the mother, who, of all persons, when
under such stress of circumstances that she would contemplate
abortion is least likely to make a dispassionate and objective de-
termination of the rights and dignity of the child she is carrying;
nor can it be said that laws protecting this life from the decisions
of a woman in such stress will violate her constitutional rights
or infringe on religious freedom.
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The dangers which would result if decisions as to the nature,
dignity and protectibility of life were to be left to subjective
determination by others is apparent when the full implications
are considered. For example, there are those who believe that
a child has not acquired humanity until the severance of the
umbilical cord, and a plausible argument can even be made that
a child is not fully human, because not fully rational, until some
later age." Nevertheless, can it be seriously suggested that a
law prohibiting the killing of a child at the moment of birth
with its umbilical cord intact or a law which prohibits infanticide
would be an unconstitutional invasion of religious liberty or
that it violates the right of privacy, equal protection or due process
of the mother?
D. Impossibility of Asserting That Fetal Life Is
Not Human From Conception.
Those who propose that all abortion laws are unconstitutional
are necessarily premising their position on the proposition that
fetal life has no right to protection. But at what point, they
might well be asked, does human life acquire protectability? At
some moment before birth? At birth itself? When the umbilical
cord is cut? When the child is no longer dependent on its
mother? When the child has become fully rational? And if the
answer is that at some time before birth protectabiity attaches,
at precisely what time does this occur and on what grounds
is the determination to be made? At viability? At quickening?
There are many who have expressed opinions concerning their
belief as to when a child becomes a person. But no one has
ever been heard to state that he knows as a matter of established
fact that a life does not acquire humanity until birth or viability
or quickening or some other time. Those who would contest
the constitutionality of laws protecting such life should, it would
seem in view of their own conceded uncertainty as to the character
of such life, have the burden of proof that this life is not
human or a person or of such worth or dignity as to be pro-
tectible under the law, for a mistake would be a deadly one
to countless numbers of innocent lives. But they have not even
attempted to meet this burden of proof. Consequently, they are
arguing in effect:
10 Population Study Commission Report to the Governor, State of Cali-
fornia, Dec. 20, 1966, p. 40, n.57.
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"We are not too sure just what this life really is which
is the victim of an abortion, so let us resolve this doubt
by killing it."
On the other hand, can they deny the state the right to
say:
"There is overwhelming physiological evidence that embryonic
life is unique and distinct from its mother at the moment
of conception, and has such a potential in its own growth
and development as to give it individuality, personality and
dignity; and in view of the fact that the law has traditionally
recognized such life as possessing legal rights from the
moment of conception, it would be inconsistent to deny
it the right which precedes and supersedes all other rights-
the right to live. Under these circumstances, without
passing on any theological propositions or belief, we feel
that this life is not only deserving of the law's protection,
but is entitled to demand, as a matter of fundamental
justice, that the law protect it."
E. Cannot Hold Anti-Abortion Laws Unconstitutinal Without
Holding Legislators' Beliefs Concerning Nature of Fetal
Life Clearly Unreasonable.
It is not clear whether the proponents of appellant's position
are suggesting that the court merely shut its eyes or avert its
attention from the problem as to the nature of fetal life, or
whether the court is being asked specifically to make a determination
that this life is not a person, is not human, has no potentiality
to distinguish it from mere tissue, has no individuality and has
nothing to invite or to permit the protection of the law.
It is hereby suggested that any proposal that the issue be
avoided or evaded cannot properly be followed. Any holding
that laws restricting abortion are unconstitutional could be sup-
portable only by a determination that conceived but unborn
life is not entitled to the law's protection. This necessarily re-
quires consideration of the nature of that life. Protectibility cannot
be excluded in the peremptory fashion proposed in these briefs
without necessarily holding that the fetus has none of the at-
tributes which would justify protection. Actually, this statement
should be even more emphatic. The court cannot hold these
laws unconstitutional without necessarily determining that it would
be entirely unreasonable and arbitrary for the legislature to decide,
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in the exercise of its lawmaking authority, that fetal life is
of such nature as to even permit the law's protection."
This is asking the court to exercise a pre-emption of wisdom
which few, if any, men would feel qualified to assume.
But how else could the court decide that laws designed to
protect fetal life are unconstitutional without of necessity making
the predetermination that the legislators would be unreasonable
in enacting legislation based upon the protectibility of life between
conception and birth? And in order to rule out protectability,
the court must rule out as frivolous and unworthy of credence
the belief on the part of the legislators that prenatal life is a
person, is human, has individuality, is not a mere appendage of its
mother, or is of such nature that its potentiality gives it dignity
and distincion. Moreover, the court would have to rule out as
unreasonable those legislators whose consciences require them to
resolve any doubt in favor of the unborn child.
It is suggested here that no one has ever had the temerity
to make these assertions, and it is an imposition to ask the court
to reach a conclusion necessarily founded on such assertions.
It is interesting to note that while the argument has been
made that a law derived from the recognition of the protectability
of prenatal life violates the establishment clause and infringes
upon religious freedom because such life happens to be recognized
by certain religious groups as possessing dignity and sanctity, there
seems to be no hestitancy in ,proclaiming as a necessary premise
to their position the antithesis of this recognition. In other words,
to state that prenatal life is of such nature as to be protectable
violates the religious clauses of the First Amendment; but to
state that prenatal life is not of such nature as to the protectable
does not violate the religious clauses of the First Amendment.
It does not seem overwhelmingly fair to silence one side to the
debate by stigmatizing its position as religious, while at the same
time it is permissible to assert the contrary.
"Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726.
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II.
There Is No Consensus of Medical Opinion Favoring the Ex-
treme Position on Abortion Advocated in Briefs Support-
ing Appellant.
The amici curiae briefs in support of appellant stress the right
of the physician to prescribe for his patient and contend that
a law prohibiting abortions unless for reasons specifically permitted
by law interferes with the right of the physician to practice medicine
and with the relationship he has with his patient.
A reading of the briefs, however, creates the inevitable im-
pression that some physicians are asking, not for the right to
practice medicine freely or to apply their medical knowledge to
patients to abort their patients, but for the right to permit patients
to abort their pregnancies for reasons substantially removed from the
scope of medical science. Complaint is voiced, for example, in the
brief filed on behalf of the medical deans and others that the
"mere fact of fertilization should not ipso facto and io instante
abolish or limit the constitutional right of the married couple
to decide whether to have a child." Complaint is made in the
Armstrong brief that the exceptions in the 1967 California statutes
on abortion do not include threat of deformity, nor are abortions
permitted "because of family planning desires of married couples
(who need occasional safe, early abortions as a backstop when
contraception fails)". (Emphasis added.)
One of the most inartful suggestions in pro-abortion literature
(and which is reflected in the briefs) is the argument that a
child has the right to be born into a family where he is "wanted."
Concededly, he does have this right, just as he has the right
to be born into a family not burdened with poverty and just
as he has the right not to be born in a slum or under conditions
where he will live a lifetime of discrimination and oppression.
But all this does not mean that his life is to be taken from
him so that he will not be deprived of these rights. These
problems should be met, but not by taking the life of the
victim of these problems.
One of the vital questions in the position of the medical pro-
fession in the matter of abortion is whether the mother alone
is the patient, or whether the physician owes a professional obliga-
ion toward the child.1" Doctor Roy Heffernan, Emeritus Clinical
1- See Liley, 'The Fetus Becomes a Patient, 198 J.A.M.A. 43 (1966).
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Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Tufts University School
of Medicine, is quoted as saying:
"Abortion has been repugnant to doctors since the beginning
of time. The pagan Hippocrates, centuries before Christ,
spoke against abortion. Down through the years, every
doctor worth his salt, has dedicated his life to the relief
of suffering and the saving of human life. And to be the
deliberate executioner of a little life entrusted to his care
must be doubly repugnant to any conscientious physician."
(Lowe, Abortion and the Law, p. 67.)
Dr. Heffernan makes it clear that, in his opinion, unfailing
opposition to abortion does not depend upon any particular phil-
osophy or any particular set of religious beliefs. He believes
that "the natural sense of morality and humanitarian feeling
which any good doctor ought to possess demands that doctors
refrain from the artificial termination of pregnancy in any woman,
no matter what her physical, mental, or economic condition,"
(Op. cit. p. 66). As to the necessity of an abortion, even to
save the life of the mother, Dr. Heffernan states:
"I can say definitely that in over forty years of obstetrics,
I have never yet seen any patient with any complications
that I believe could be relieved by abortion. In many
instances, abortion would have been far more expedient,
would have been far easier as a solution to a difficult
problem. Many of the patients I treated had serious heart
disease and other complications. I was forced to work very
hard at providing proper treatment and care. Sometimes
my patients were forced to have long and expensive periods
of hospitalization. But, surely, all this is but a small price
to pay for a human life. When my patient finally had
her child, and the little baby she had been carrying was a
living human being, I certainly never regretted taking the
course that I had." (Op. cit. p. 68.)
There has been some endeavor on behalf of appellant to give
the impression that there is a consensus in the medical profession
concerning proper indications for therapeutic abortion, and par-
ticularly favoring the extreme position advocated in these briefs.
Concededly, there are many physicians who favor some liberaliza-
tion of abortion laws; but in its policy statement adopted June
21, 1967 concerning therapeutic abortonj, the American Medical
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Association made it clear that there is no consensus among phy-
sicians as to the medical justification for abortion. This state-
ment is introduced as follows:
"The American Medical Association is cognizant of the
fact that there is no consensus among physicians regarding
the medical indications for therapeutic abortion." (Policy
Statement of the American Medical Association on Ther-
apeutic Abortion-adopted June 21, 1967.)
It should not be overlooked that the thrust of the argument
in support of appellant in the present case is against all restraint
on abortion. Not only is this made clear in the briefs, but if the
statute under which the defendant was prosecuted, wherein abortion
is prohibited except where necessary to save the life of the mother,
is found unconstitutional, notwithstanding the prevalence of such
legislation throughout the nation, the result will be to deprive
the states of the right to act at all in this field. Any impression
that the medical profession, as such, favors such an extreme position,
is incorrect. The statement from the American Medical As-
sociation, referred to above, would permit abortion only under
the most restricted circumstances.
A statement issued by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, and approved by their executive board on May
9, 1968, was introduced as follows:
"It is formally stated that the College will not condone
nor support the concept that an abortion be considered
or performed for an unwanted pregnancy or as a means of
population control. It is emphasized that the inherent
risk of such an abortion is not fully appreciated, both by
many in the profession and certainly not by the public.
Where abortions may be obtained on demand, as in Japan
and the Soviet Union, medical authorities from both these
nations indicate that the physical and psychological sequelae
are still to be determined." (The American College of
Obsietricians and Gynecologists, Introduction to Statement
on Therapeutic Abortion, May 9, 1968.)
The foregoing statement should be contrasted with the argument
that the decision should be left to the control of the mother
to decide whether or not she will bear a child, and with the
optimistic and .unsupported statement that an abortion is relatively
harmless and even safer than carrying a child full term.
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It has been stated by a medical authority:
"The more urgent the physical indications for therapeutic
abortion, the greater the contra-indications because of the
hazard of the operation.-Over the years, a goodly number
of patients have refused the operative intervention which
we recommended and from these brave women (or stub-
born, senseless women as you would have it) we have
learned more about the true indications for therapeutic
abortion than from all the articles that have been written
on the subject." (K. P. Russell, quoted by C. P. Harrison,
On the Futility of Legalizing Abortion, the Canadian
Medical Association Journal, August 20, 1966.)
It has been pointed out in a preceding section to this brief
that physiological data support the individuality, personality and
humanity of conceived but unborn life. It is suggested that the
reluctance of the medical profession to reach any consensus con-
cerning indications for therapeutic abortion, as stated by the
American Medical Association, must be prompted in part by their
recognition of the physiological evidence. T. N. A. Jeffcoate, writ-
ing in the British Medical Journal in 1960, and quoted by Harrison,
supra, has stated:
"The destruction of the living embryo offends something
fundamental in human nature, and the most scientifically
detached gynecologist cannot fail to approach the operation
with an uneasiness which has been variously accredited to
'primordial revulsion' and 'subtle, archaic motives'."
It has been stated by another authority:
"The joining of sperm and egg in conception creates a
truly unique individual that carries a bit of all mankind
and much that has never existed before. The embryo
and fetus are not developmentally the same as a newborn
child, but biologically they are a part of humanity. There
are times in the development of the fetus when I, as a
physician, might feel its survival is less important than a
calculated threat to the mother. There is in my opinion
no time when its value can be completely rejected and
it is dubious that one can clearly 'help' it by destroying
it." (Kenneth J. Ryan, A Scale of Values, an Essay
on the Medical Indications for Therapeutic Abortion.)
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It should be clear that there is no consensus of medical opinion
favoring abortion at the will or whim of the mother, and that
the effort pursued in the present case to eliminate all legal restrictions
on abortion remains a grievous and dangerous endeavor with the
probability of appalling consequences.
III.
A Child Conceived but Not Yet Born Has Many Rights Recog-
nized and Protected by Law, Including the Right to Life,
and Laws Designed to Protect This Right Are Not Uncon-
stitutional.
Other briefs filed herein have demonstrated most cogently the
development of the law to the point where it recognizes that a
conceived but unborn child has legally protected rights.
The opposition has expressed some displeasure over the use
of the term "conceived but unborn child" with reference to
what they would prefer to term an "embryo", a "fetus", "con-
ceptus," a "zygote," a "blastocyst," or some other even more
unpleasant designation. However, the term "child" for the con-
ceived but unborn existence has good authority, particularly in
California, Civil Code Section 29 commences as follows:
"A child, conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed
an existing person ... "
Penal Code Section 270, covering the obligation of a father to
support a minor child, states, in part:
"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed
an existing person insofar as this section is concerned."
Civil Code Section 196a, which covers the obligation of support
of an illegitimate child has been held in Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal.
App. 2d 122 to refer to "an unborn child" in the following
language:
"Under such circumstances, Section 29 must be read
together with Section 196a so as to confer the right of
an unborn child to a guardian ad litem to compel the
right to support conferred by the code."
Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, is replete with
references to "unborn child", refers to the duty of the father
to unborn child and states:
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every child, while in gestation, needs the materials
for which to form bone, tissue, nerves and the other com-
ponents of its bodily structure. Without them it cannot
grow or develop, or continue to live."
Accordingly, the use of the term "unborn child" is not, as has
been implied, an unwarranted appeal to the emotions. It is based
on the most respectable authority, particularly, in the context of a
confrontation concerning the human rights of that child.
It would be an uncomfortable and strange, inconsistency in the
law if no one could injure a conceived but unborn 9 hild- without
being held accountable for that injury, but he could kill the child
without recourse.
It is conceded by all that a conceived, but unborn child (under
any appellation one may select) is entitled to a substantial number
of rights, including property rights, inheritance rights, and the
right to be free of injury. It seems to follow With irresstble logic
that if a being is recognized as a person for the possession of any
rights, the right to life cannot be ignored as thoigh the concept
were entirely irrelevant. It has been urgea that these rights do
not really attach unless the child is born. This, however,' is an
oversimplification. Some rights, by their very nature, evene t 'ough
they exist prior to birth, cannot be given financial recognition
until the child is born. The right' to recover for injuries, for ex-
ample, would be most difficult to enforce unless the child is born
and the existence and extent of the injuries inflicted before birth,
in violation of its rights, are subject t6 observation. But this is
not to deny that the child has a right,, before': he is , born, not
to be injured, just as he has the right to inherit, or to hold
property.
Other rights, however, are subject not only to, recognition but
to actual enforcengnt prior to birth. In Kyne v. Kyne, 38, Cal.
App. 2d 122, not only was it declared that the conceived, but un-
born child has a right to be supported by its father before birth,
but that the unborn child has a right to have .a guardian ad litem
appointed to compel enforcement of this right. In fact, the court
stated:
"It would be a strange doctrine to hold that a father was
criminally liable for failure to: support an unborn child,
but that there 'was no, civil action by which the unborn
child, through its guardian, could:enforce that. responsibility."
ABORTION LEGISLATION, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Although it appears clear that the right to support which the
existing, but unborn child possesses is necessarily founded on a
right to life, this right was recognized under the most dramatic
circumstances in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mer. Hospital v.
Anderson, 4 N. J. 421, 201 A. 2d 537 (cert. denied 377 U.S. 985)
where the court placed this right to life above that right which
the law so zealously protects, the right of free religious conscience
in the mother. It is no answer to say that the mother, preferred
life, as has been suggested. Of course, she did; but she con-
sidered her own conscience paramount, and resisted efforts to
force her to have a transfusion. The court held the child was
entitled to a guardian to compel its mother to submit to the
transfusion, not to protect the life of the mother, but to protect
the life of the child.
The right to life is a sacred one, deemed inalienable by the
Declaration of Independence and protected, insofar as applicable
here, by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. In these circumstances, in view of the status the law
has recognized as applying to a conceived, but unborn child,
from property rights, to the right to be free of injury, to the
right to life itself, it is submitted that the action by the legis-
lature to protect that right to life in its prohibition against abortion
is immune from at-tack.
Conclusion.
By reason of the foregoing, and the reasoning contained in
the other briefs in support of respondent, it is believed that the
court should decide that the state has the right, and, indeed
the duty, to protect conceived, but unborn human life, and that
laws seeking to perform that function do not thereby violate
constitutional restraints.**
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